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PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION IN THE SOVIET MILITARY.(U)
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MAT ROLAND L. GAMBOLATI

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PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION IN THE SOVIET MILITARY

MAJOR RONALD L. GAMBOLATI

March 1975

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FOREWORD

This research project represents fulfillment of a student requirement for successful completion of Phase III Training of the Department of the Army's Foreign Area Officer Program (Russian).

Only unclassified sources are used in producing the research paper. The opinions, value judgments and conclusions expressed are those of the author and in no way reflect official policy of the United States Government; Department of Defense; Department of the Army; Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of Intelligence; or the United States Army Institute for Advanced Russian and East European Studies.

Interested readers are invited to send their comments to the Commander of the Institute.

RICHARD P. KELLY
LTC, MI
Commander

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SUMMARY

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The Soviet Armed Forces constitutes the only potential challenger to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for leadership power and control. To ensure its domination over the Armed Forces, the Communist Party has instituted a system of political controls (not discussed in this paper) and conducts a widespread campaign of propaganda and agitation. With intensive inputs of socio-political and military oriented propaganda and agitation, the Communist Party is creating a political and ideological base for voluntary submission by the masses to its control and domination. The basic aims and methods utilized in the propaganda and agitation campaign are the theme of this paper.

↑

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INTRODUCTION

Plekhanov, the Russian Marxist of the late nineteenth century, made a distinction between propaganda and agitation, and these two concepts were "borrowed" by the Bolsheviks for their own purposes. According to Bolshevik, now Communist, ideology, propaganda is the broad ideological education of a few, while agitation is a narrowed indoctrination in ideology for the masses. In essence this concept results in the thorough education in Marxist-Leninist doctrine for those members who make up the elite (i.e. Communist Party) and who are capable of absorbing the depths of political ideology while providing complex political ideology reduced to layman's terms on a massive scale to the populace. In the latter case, the information provided is in sufficient detail to keep the masses informed (or ignorant) in the detail desired by the agitator and his superiors.

The western concept of propaganda and agitation is quite different. The term "propaganda" has taken on a pejorative meaning; it has become a "dirty word" in western society. But propaganda is really nothing more than a means of convincing someone to do or not to do something,

to believe or not to believe something, or to react or not to react to something. Every radio and television commercial is a form of propaganda. The western concept of "agitation" is one of imagining a political radical standing on a soap box harranguing at the top of his voice. The Soviet agitator, while possibly displaying enthusiasm and emotion, is a very calm and orderly individual; he is organized and efficient, as he must be to do his job well.

The purpose of this introduction is to establish the definitions which will be used throughout this paper. The Bolshevik definitions conflict with those generally accepted in the western world. To discuss each point throughout the paper in light of the conflicting definitions would be lengthy and pointless. The most logical answer appeared to be a statement defining each term as it is to be understood throughout this paper. The resulting definitions amount to a consolidation of the western concept of propaganda and the Soviet concept of agitation. They are as follows: PROPAGANDA: The means utilized to convince someone to accept, reject or remain neutral to a stated concept or idea. AGITATION: the means by which the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and its affiliates spread propaganda to the masses.

One main point about propaganda which must always be considered, regardless of its source, is its factual basis. Propaganda may be based on myths, truths, half-

truths or lies. Propaganda can only be as effective as its credibility to its audience. It is a waste of time and effort to base propaganda on a lie if the target audience will know that it is based on a lie and will reject it outright. The key phrase in the last sentence was "if the target audience will know it is a lie," for in the Soviet Union, with its controlled news media, propaganda based on the myth, half-truth or lie may or may not be rejected by the audience, depending on the alternate sources of information which might be available (Voice of America, BBC, etc.). There is also the possibility that, even if some members of the audience recognize the propaganda as based on other than the whole truth, would these members have the courage to expose the truth, knowing that they would be vulnerable to possible arrest under Article 58 of the Soviet Penal Code for "anti-Soviet agitation."¹

With the definitions established and the possible bases for propaganda exposed, the Soviet methods of propaganda and agitation and the goals they wish to achieve may now be examined.

PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION GOALS

Experience shows that fighting men engage the enemy most courageously in those units where there is a strong Party organization and political propaganda and agitation are properly organized.²

The Soviet Armed Forces, by its sheer size and strength, presents the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) with the only existing potential challenge for power in the Soviet Union. In order to preclude any such possible challenge to its authority, the CPSU must ensure the complete domination by the Party over the Armed Forces and the complete loyalty of the Armed Forces to the Party and state, which, for all intents and purposes, may be considered as one and the same organization. The methods employed by the CPSU to ensure its domination over the military are propaganda and agitation. The two basic subjects of military propaganda and agitation are socio-political and military with the single goal of indoctrinating the individual with the ideology and concepts desired by the Party.

By the time the young Soviet recruit enters the Armed Forces, he has been exposed to approximately nineteen years of Soviet propaganda. He has been exposed mainly to socio-political propaganda which has told him how wonderful life is in the Soviet Union and how much he has to be thankful for. As in civilian life, the new soldier is told again

and again of the leading role of the Communist Party. As one Soviet military author explained:

"...the Party's leadership manifests itself now, as well as in the past, in the fact that the problems of defense of the socialist Motherland, military development, theory and practice are exclusively solved on the basis of the Party's ideology and policy."³

(Indoctrination while in the military constitutes the continuation of the Party's effort to create the "new Soviet man."⁴ The socio-political aspects of propaganda and agitation tend to stress the political studies and the positive aspects of Communist political control while also placing great emphasis on the elimination of social problems. The twofold technique of accentuating the positive and combatting the negative is a continuation of the efforts to develop the "new Soviet man." This technique is based on the continual stress of the individual's responsibilities to the land and state which have provided him with so much. Peer pressure and personal integrity play a great role in the development of social awareness. In case these pressures are not enough, the legal punishments are also mentioned, but usually not stressed, as the methodological concept of the propaganda and agitation in social questions is based on the voluntary acts of the individual and,

hopefully, not out of fear of the consequences of improper action.⁵ As part of the development of social awareness and attitudes, much propaganda and agitation in the military is directed towards combatting alcoholism, hooliganism and other anti-social traits. Appeals are made to the loyalty and socialist dedication of each individual soldier to uphold the honor of the socialist Motherland by behaving in the proper socialist manner. If the carrot method does not work, the stick can be applied with the swiftness and harshness that the maintenance of military discipline requires, for the military punishment for offenses is often much harsher than the civilian assessment for a similar offense.⁶ But while socio-political indoctrination plays an important role in the ideological development of the Soviet soldier, it is a secondary. The main emphasis of propaganda and agitation is directed toward the creation of an obedient, efficient and effective fighting man.

Political indoctrination is the key to military success according to Soviet doctrine. The Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet Union A. A. Grechko, said: "Reared by the Communist Party to defend the gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution, our Army owes all its successes and victories over the enemies of the revolution to the firm leadership of the Party and its Central Committee."⁷ Marshal Grechko set the example for all members

of the Armed Forces in pledging the loyalty of the military and the Soviet equivalent of "Duty, Honor, Country" when he continued: "We, Communists of the Army, and the entire Soviet Army and Navy assure the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the glorious Communist Party of the Soviet Union and our entire people that the Soviet Armed Forces, loyal to the Party (stress added) and to their people, are always ready to carry out with honor their sacred military duty in defending our Motherland."⁸

The Soviet Armed Forces have an intricate system of Party control and political counter-espionage networks. It is sufficient to say on this subject that Party organizations extend down to company level or equivalent and that the second in command of every unit company-level or equivalent and higher is the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs, a system which somewhat resembles the commissar system of earlier periods. Needless to say, the Party utilizes the political network within the Armed Forces to know all and to control all, a necessary prerequisite to ensuring that the Armed Forces accomplish their mission of protecting the CPSU from its enemies, both foreign and domestic.⁹

Political indoctrination in the Soviet military serves more than as a means of ensuring the political reliability of the Armed Forces (although this is its main task). Political indoctrination through propaganda and agitation is a means for assisting in the development of other desired

military traits. One Soviet military author describes the aim of political indoctrination as threefold: 1) to develop in the soldier a deep ideological conviction; 2) to develop a sense of collectivism; and 3) to develop a sense of personal responsibility for the "destinies of the Motherland."¹⁰ The third point is the key to extending political education to other aspects of military training: the "destinies of the Motherland" rely on a well trained armed force, therefore it is patriotic and politically and socially advisable to develop the necessary military skills which could decide those destinies. This is true not only for manual skills like marksmanship, coordinated crew training, manual of arms, etc., but also for psychological qualities such as discipline, confidence and leadership traits.¹¹ The latter category is especially significant for young officers as a tremendous psychological contradiction exists in the development of initiative while there is a predilection towards unquestioning obedience. The result is that young officers tend to be indecisive.¹² Training for the officer must not only develop his skills, but must, in some way, add to his prestige, a very important aspect in the Soviet military.¹³ In a description of the qualities desired in the Soviet officer, it is interesting to note the sequence of traits in the following: "Ideological conviction, political awareness and constant readiness to

defend his country make up the foundations on which all other moral and fighting qualities of the Soviet officer as a commander of an army of the new type, an army of the socialist state, are being molded."¹⁴

In addition to accentuating loyalty to the Party and developing useful military skills, propaganda and agitation are used to develop pride in Soviet military history and in the history of one's unit and its traditions.

Pride in the unit helps to reinforce awareness of the collective, builds on the need to continue the honorable traditions of a unit and promotes self-discipline, (along with command and peer pressure) not to dishonor the unit.

Propaganda and agitation develop loyalty to the Party, the nation and to the military unit. They attempt to instill in the individual a sense of responsibility towards his government, nation and unit--a sense of responsibility which will cause him to seek voluntarily improvements in himself in order to be worthy of his role in life. All of this intensive indoctrination aims at the creation and retention of a loyal and efficient combat force which will execute without question the orders of the CPSU. Such a force, created through the efforts of propaganda and agitation, is supposedly based on the solidarity of the ideological convictions of its members. This is the great goal of the Communists and all of their efforts: to create a society where all people think alike on the basis of

ideological conviction. "Man's ideological conviction, his implicit faith in the triumphs of communism, and his urge to accelerate its advent by intense efforts are of vast importance. . . No power can break an ideologically convinced man."¹⁵

SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION MATERIAL AND TECHNIQUES

The basis of selection of material and techniques for propaganda depends on the type of audience to which the material will be presented. As mentioned earlier, an audience is usually divided into three groups: 1) those who will completely accept the material, 2) those who will completely reject the material, and 3) those who are open-minded and can be convinced by the logic of the propagandist's argument. For the propagandist the first and second groups present no problem, for those who already accept the argument need no further convincing and, for those who completely reject the argument, no amount of debate or evidence will convince them to change their minds. That leaves the third group as the real target audience and challenge for the propagandist, for he is matching his ability to persuade against the portion of the audience which is still open to argument. The Soviet audience, unlike its western counterpart, is not made up primarily of members of the third group, but by members of the first group--those who are willing to accept the material, at least publicly. That concept often narrows the general mission of the Soviet propagandist to reinforcing ideological material rather than having to present an initial convincing argument. But the Soviet propagandist or agitator is skilled in his trade and leaves nothing to chance.¹⁶ Preparation for propaganda and agitation

sessions is quite thorough and, within a unit, coordination between Party organizations, the Komsomol (Young Communist League), political departments and the local AGITPROP (Agitation and Propaganda Bureau--civilian organization located in towns and cities and responsible for public propaganda displays and organizing local propaganda and agitation activities) is a normal course of events. In some cases, military units have created propaganda councils to coordinate propaganda and agitation activities, to advise the propagandist as to where more emphasis is needed, and to suggest new methods, techniques and subjects.¹⁷

Propaganda and agitation topic selection is based on orders from the Party and the needs of the commander. Every commander is personally responsible for the organization of combat training and political education of subordinates. Thus, topics are chosen which give the commander the broadest coverage and meet the requirements. Of particular use is the study of military heroes, their lives and their exploits, for this study aids in both the political and military areas of concern. On the political side, it stresses loyalty and patriotism to Party and country, while on the military side it stresses discipline, training and the heroic military tradition.

Having selected or been presented with the list of topics, the propagandist or agitator next selects the method he will use in his approach. He usually begins with

an analysis of his audience: the educational level, training level, number of Communists and Komsomol members, number of non-Russians, officers or enlisted men. He knows their strong and weak points as well as their thoughts and sentiments.¹⁸ Once he knows his audience, the propagandist or agitator may begin his preparation.

In their preparation, the propagandist and agitator remember above all else, Lenin's propaganda principle:

"The maximum of Marxism with the maximum of popularity and simplicity."¹⁹

The preparation is often painstaking and always very thorough. Journals and periodicals are read and annotated; files of clippings are maintained for future reference; extensive use is made of the propagandist's own personal library or the facilities of Party organizations or political departments along with the coordination with these groups. The propagandist may even utilize facts and stories typical of everyday life in the unit.²⁰ Once he has collected all his source material, the propagandist prepares his material for presentation and gathers all of the necessary training aids.

The material available to the propagandist is as varied as his imagination. His basic source is written material in the form of books, periodicals and pamphlets--much of which is available in the unit library for required reading prior to the presentation. Reading often includes

articles published in western journals and newspapers and previously discussed at political meetings.²¹ Often detailed advice on how to conduct a certain block of instruction may be found in various Soviet publications.²² A number of training aids are available to propagandists and these include what the Soviets consider "technical means" of propaganda. Radio and television broadcasts of special events are often used as the center of a discussion; slides, film strips and films are popular and entertaining. Phonographs and tape recorders can be set in vans and martial music played while a unit is marching or in the field for training. The possibilities are almost endless.²³

Having analyzed his audience, gathered his material and prepared his presentation, the propagandist is ready to select the method by which he will present his material. The method is under constant consideration while the propagandist analyzes his audience and prepares his material, for these are primary factors in the selection of the method of presentation. The method selected must meet the requirements of Lenin's maximum on propaganda mentioned above as it must be the method with the widest appeal to the audience and still be the best method for presenting the material. The basic methods open to the propagandist are the seminar, lecture, and practical exercise (or any combination). The method selected will be the one which best meets the requirements of the propagandist and the commander. But whatever method is selected, the main

pedagogical technique used throughout the course of instruction will be competition.

As mentioned above, the Soviet military suffers from the conflict between the concept of unquestioned obedience and initiative, often referred to by Soviet authors as the conflict between "formalism" and initiative.²⁴ Lenin, in an article entitled "How to Organize Competition?", states that socialism foster competition in that it gives everyone the opportunity to display his abilities, to develop his capacities and to reveal his talents. Lenin continues with the advice that every attempt to establish stereotyped forms and to impose uniformity from above, "as intellectuals are so inclined to do," must be combatted.²⁵ It is on Lenin's advice that the commander and the propagandist foster competition within the unit. The competition should create a healthy atmosphere and should produce results. According to Soviet doctrine, the main principle of competition is "guaranteeing the opportunity to repeat experiences worthy of repetition" and the creation of a "healthy rivalry."²⁶ The basic concept of "socialist competition" is the recognition of the outstanding members of the unit and the development of the desire in others to join those ranks. Competition also raises the prestige and authority of those recognized as being outstanding members of the unit, or in Soviet ideological parlance, the outstanding members of the collective.²⁷

The most common method of recognition is the awarding of badges or medals for outstanding achievement. As in other armies, the Soviet army has award ceremonies to recognize the achievements of its members. But some commanders and propagandists have thought of novel ways to extend recognition to members of units. War veterans and heroes are often invited to award ceremonies where they relate to the congregation their experiences which are worthy of emulation. This is especially effective if the hero is a present or former member of the unit.²⁸

One enterprising propagandist used a technique often employed by Agitprop (the display in the centers of towns and cities of pictures of workers who had already fulfilled or overfulfilled their work norms and other Heroes of Socialist Labor) and had the "pictures of the men who had distinguished themselves in the missile firing practice on that day...on display with their achievements in the socialist emulation."²⁹ Another example of initiative in the recognition of achievement was demonstrated by Colonel-General M. K. Kalashnik (who was a colonel and Major-General Grechko's political officer during World War II), who had commanders write letters to the parents of heroes. The letters were read at a unit formation prior to being mailed.³⁰

While competition is developed throughout a unit, competition is also organized within groups by ranks. During political classes, for example, enlisted men are placed in groups of 20-25 men according to their time in the service; sergeants and senior sergeants (starshinas) are placed in their own groups.³¹ Thus, a private is not competing against a sergeant and the goals are fair and attainable. Competition among officers exists, although not in such a formal setting. Officers are expected to be competitive and to seek constantly improvement and achievement. While many activities are not mandatory for officers, it is suggested that commanders should require active participation by all officers in propaganda activities on a regular basis.³²

Part of the Soviet concept of socialist competition rests in the belief that competition should be such that the goals are attainable and that the individual should be able to work on his own, thereby instilling initiative. This presents a methodological problem for the commander and the propagandist, for they must ensure success without sacrificing the quality desired in the end. The ideal, therefore, is the uniting of theory with practical military aspects, with concrete problems that the soldiers themselves can work out.³³ Sometimes propaganda and agitation work in the military is not easy. One Soviet

author comments that some military units have "weak military traditions" and that the personnel of these units must be convinced that they are the ones who, through their own efforts, can create outstanding traditions for their unit.³⁴

Throughout the entire spectrum of propaganda and agitation activities, the single most important methodological characteristic is personal contact. Whether the contact be in the formal atmosphere of lectures, seminars and question and answer periods where the propagandist is the main character, or in less formal circumstances, which will be discussed below, where the agitator plays the key role, personal contact with and exposure to the troops reinforces the material which has been presented. In every case the propagandist becomes associated with the themes of education and training and his mere presence is often enough to act as a catalyst in the collective reaction to improve efforts. Communist doctrine proclaims that the Party member or the Komsomol member cannot do too much. Propagandists are encouraged to converse frequently with the young soldiers and to exert their influence as Communists wherever and whenever possible.³⁵ This is especially effective during free time and at informal gatherings.

The Soviet soldier, sailor or airman is exposed to propaganda and agitation not only at formal classes, but

wherever he may be, whether on official duty or during free time. Soldiers are encouraged to use their free time to improve their socialist education. Almost every unit has its political library and commanders and propagandists seek to instill in their men a "love for military-political literature."³⁶ Frequent appearance at the library by propagandists and agitators often leads to "enlightening" discussions on political history or modern problems. Other types of informal activities which are open to propaganda and agitation are social activities. A unit may form a choir which sings patriotic songs, or a folk dance ensemble with a band drawn from the talent found within the unit (folk dances would portray the solidarity of the various national groups which form the Soviet Union). Dances are sometimes arranged in the nearby towns and villages and such activities are excellent opportunities to recognize outstanding soldiers in the presence of their military comrades and the civilian populace.

Another active location which lends itself to propaganda and agitation is the unit club. Clubs present a relaxed atmosphere where unit leaders, outstanding soldiers and combat heroes can promote the principles of ideology in a casual manner. Clubs are an ideal location for the display of propaganda posters and wall newspapers. In units located near populated areas, it is not unusual for the unit to create a Youth Club which is designed to expose the youth of the area to military life and the propaganda and agitation activities of the Komsomol and Party organization which sponsor the club.³⁸

Every opportunity is utilized to expose the Soviet soldier to propaganda. A popular and favorite method of propagandists and activists is the use of cultural events to spread the ideological word. Films have always been popular with the Soviet soldier and, since the films have to be approved by the Party censor for the proper socialistic content, they are a useful tool for the propagandist. Popular films often provide (especially those with a military plot-- and now that the Soviet Union is celebrating the thirtieth anniversary of the glorious defeat of fascism, this type of film is very likely to be abundant and popular) all of the aspects that any military propagandist could want to cover. The theater provides an excellent propaganda vehicle. Socialist plays may be produced by a unit and put on in the unit club or attendance at the local theater for performance may be encouraged. Military museums and unit "rooms of honor" are frequently visited by groups of Soviet military. These cultural attractions offer the propagandist the opportunity of explaining military equipment, expounding on the exploits of Soviet heroes and discussing unit traditions.

Thus the propaganda barrage to which the Soviet soldier is submitted continues in its Orwellian fashion prophesied by Zamiatin and Huxley. At any and every moment the member of the Soviet Armed Forces is subjected to the history of the glorious deeds of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the heroic deeds of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the great achievements made by the Soviet

people under the leadership of the Party. The propagandist and agitator are given every opportunity imaginable to ply their trade. If the "new Soviet men" is never created, it will not be due to a lack of trying.

CONCLUSIONS³⁹

The goal of the military propagandist and agitator is to create an efficient and effective fighting machine which is completely loyal to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.⁴⁰ The efforts toward the accomplishment of this task are given every possible support within the capability of the Soviet Union. The Soviet military man is deluged with Marxist-Leninist ideology; he is given only Truth (Pravda) and other state-controlled press to read while being denied the opportunity to study events as expressed in western, or non-socialist, news media. Everything seems to favor the "System" in the accomplishment of the goal. The goal and methodology are there for the propagandist to utilize. "They must use the force of the Party word, the irresistible truth of the material they are expounding to inspire in each man a passionate desire to improve his combat readiness day after day."⁴¹ Yet problems exist and the Soviet leaders, military and civilian, admit they exist. After fifty-seven years of Communist rule, the goal of creating the "new Soviet man" has not been realized, although advances have been made. The question of the effectiveness of the Soviet propagandist and agitator and the degree to which they are achieving their goal of creating the efficient fighting force completely loyal to the Communist Party will only be answered when the Soviet Armed Forces are put to the real test.

FOOTNOTES

¹Cf. A. Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, chapter 2, for more detailed information.

²V. Yusov, "Education of the Soviet Soldier," Soviet Military Review (hereafter referred to as SMR), 8(August, 1972), p. 60.

³Ibid.

⁴N. Chebykin, "Bor'ba za kachestvo politzaniatii--bor'ba za ikh effektivnost'," Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil (hereafter referred to as KVS), 11 (June, 1974), p. 60. "... the efficiency of all political studies, as in all ideological work, aims, first of all, to assist in the formation of the 'new man.' The development of his ideological conviction, his communist consciousness, his Marxist-Leninist appreciation--all to increase social-political activity and awareness."

⁵V. Maslov and E. Litvinov, "Pravovomu vospitaniyu--effektivnuiu metodiku," KVS, 5(March, 1974), p. 68. "In contrast to the armies of the past and the present-day imperialist armies, discipline in the Soviet Armed Forces is based not on fear of punishment and coercion, but on the high political awareness of servicemen, their deep realization of their patriotic duty." S. Titov, "Conscientiously and Scrupulously," SMR, 9(September, 1973), p. 44.

⁶Interview with Gregori Mikhailovich Viktorov of USAIAREES, 13 Jan 75.

⁷A. Grechko, "The Party, People and Army are One," SMR, 5(May, 1971), p. 2.

⁸Ibid., p. 5.

⁹The Russians do not put it quite so bluntly. Colonel-General M. Kalashnik, deputy head of the Chief Political Department (GPU) of the Soviet Army and Navy, lists the missions of the Soviet Armed Forces as: 1) to maintain the gains of the October Revolution, 2) to implement state policy of workers and peasants in their struggle for socialism and communism, and 3) to act in the defense of the "peaceful life." M. Kalashnik, "Political Education in the Soviet Armed Forces," SMR, 10(October, 1965), p. 13. It still amounts to protecting the CPSU.

¹⁰G. Rodin, "Self-Control in Battle," SMR, 5(May, 1973), p. 40.

¹¹B. Khoziev, "Self-Reliance," SMR, 3(March, 1973), p. 40. "Confidence or self-reliance is a psychic state deriving from a man's ideological conviction, his clear understanding of the tasks confronting him, of his role and place in carrying them out." Also, A. Bazanov and V. Gavriluk, "Psychological Training of Soldiers," SMR, 8(August, 1966), p. 17: A man who is not "tempered ideologically" sees danger everywhere, he becomes a "slave of fear" and "succumbs to base emotions."

¹²Viktorov, personal interview, 13 Jan 75.

¹³V. Lutsenko, "The Young Officer's Prestige," SMR, 9(September, 1973), p. 20. "Ideological convictions, political consciousness, a responsible attitude towards his duties, honesty, modesty, political and social activity, and proper behavior in everyday life are essential conditions for the establishment of ... prestige."

¹⁴A. Kravchenko, "Officer Training," SMR, 5(May, 1971), p. 9. An interview with Colonel-General K. Ambaryan, Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Land Forces. Also, V. Khobotov, "Psychological Stealing of Soldiers," SMR, 3(March, 1973), p. 47: "... every commander should ... be distinguished for his high level of political, tactical and technical training."

¹⁵"Militant Organ of the Communists in the Soviet Armed Forces," SMR, 10(October, 1965), p. 59. The entire effort could almost be compared with the U.S. Code of Conduct, but applied to the civilian populace as well as to the military.

¹⁶N. Bubelev, "Aktivnost' propagandistov," KVS, 13(July, 1974), p. 64. The author goes on to describe the selection process for propagandists and agitators: officers where possible, mostly Communists, members of political directorates and Party organizations, former instructors of Marxist-Leninist ideology--in other words, people who are generally prepared for the mission.

¹⁷A. Sidorenko, "Zakrepliat' i razvivat' dostignutye uspekhi," KVS, 11(June, 1974), p. 45. Also mentioned in A. Debaliuk, "Stabnye partorganizatsii i upravlenie voiskami," KVS, 14(July, 1974), p. 53.

¹⁸V. Staritsyn, "A Political Worker's Talent," SMR, 5(May, 1973), p. 25.

¹⁹Quoted by D. Mokeev, "The Commander's Vivifying Word," SMR, 3(March, 1973), p. 39.

²⁰Ibid. A very good short article on the preparation by the propagandist is "Propagandist," by A. Morozov and G. Timokhin, SMR, 1(January, 1972), pp. 40-43.

²¹P. Dragovoz, "Politrabotnik eskadril'i," KVS, 24(December, 1973), p. 44.

²²Agitator is a bi-weekly journal which gives advice on how to conduct agitation and propaganda, to include suggestions for posters, topics for discussions and ideas for social activities. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, also a bi-weekly journal, often carries two departments: "Iz opyta ideologicheskoi raboty" ("From the experience of ideological work") and "Rukovoditeliam grupp politicheskikh zaniatii" ("To the group leaders of political studies") with articles by military leaders who share their experiences in the fields of propaganda and agitation. Two good examples are presented by: 1) Z. Osipov, "Vooruzhennyye sily SSSR v gody mirnogo sotsialisticheskogo stroitel'stva," in which the author outlines an eight-hour course on the

history of Soviet development, complete with a course breakdown of topics to be discussed, sample questions for discussion and training aids to be used. KVS, 10(May, 1974), pp. 70-77; and 2) E. Lukanin, "Lenin o zashchite sotsialisticheskogo otchestva. Leninskie zavety sovetskim voenam," in which the author discusses a twelve-hour block of instruction on Lenin and the defense of the socialist fatherland. KVS, 1(January, 1974), pp. 70-77. "Every issue of Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil carries materials and explains methods of the subjects which are studies in the political education system." "Militant Organ of the Communists in the Soviet Armed Forces," SMR, 10(October, 1965), p. 58.

²³Unfortunately, maximum use is not always made of the material available. V. Kondiurin, "Polnee ispol'zovat' tekhnicheskie sredstva propagandy," KVS, 10(May, 1974), pp. 53, 54: serious shortcomings exist in the exploitation of technical propaganda. Material is not always available and many propagandists do not know what is available or how to use it.

²⁴N. Pariferov, "Politotdel i ideinaia zakalka molodykh ofitserov," KVS, 19(October, 1974), p. 69.

²⁵V. I. Lenin, "Kak organizovat' sorevnovanie?" Complete Collected Works, volume 35, pp. 195-205.

²⁶"Sotsialisticheskoe sorevnovanie i ego rol' v povyshenii boevoi gotovnosti chasti i korablia," KVS, 22(November, 1973), pp. 77, 78.

²⁷S. Maev, "Kommunisty i sorevnovanie," KVS, 17(September, 1974), p. 49.

²⁸I. Forofonov, "Kak provesti zaniatia s molodymi soldatami i matrosami," KVS, 5(March, 1974), p. 69.

²⁹V. Staritsyn, "A Political Worker's Talent," SMR, 5(May, 1973), p. 24.

³⁰A. Korkreshkin, "Proved in Battle," SMR, 1(January, 1972), p. 60.

³¹M. Kalashnik, "Political Education in the Soviet Armed Forces," SMR, 10(October, 1965), p. 15.

³²N. Lysukhin, "Komandir chasti i politzaniatia," KVS, 7(April, 1974), p. 73.

³³V. Bromberg, "Zabota o metodicheskoi roste propagandistov," KVS, 15(August, 1974), p. 72.

³⁴N. Pilipchuk, "Propaganda boevykh traditsii na politzaniatiiakh," KVS, 18(September, 1974), p. 67. P. Nikitin complains that, when problems like this arise, propagandists and commanders fail to listen to or properly utilize the Communists of the rank and file who know the troops and can give good advice. "Ucheba, kontrol', pomoshch'," KVS, 4(February, 1974), p. 50.

³⁵L. Yakovishin, "Vместе с воинами," KVS, 8(April, 1974), p. 63.

³⁶V. Chernov, "Privivat' voenam navyki politicheskoi ucheby," KVS, 3(February, 1974), p. 66.

³⁷A. Morozov and G. Timokhin, "Propagandist," SMR, 1(January, 1972), p. 43. Wall newspapers (stengazety) are copies of newspapers (Pravda, Izvestia or some other Party paper) displayed on special bulletin boards for all to read. This assures exposure of propaganda to those who cannot afford a paper or those who would otherwise not have read one. (Author's note.)

³⁸An article entitled "Club for Future Officers" appeared in SMR, 4(April, 1972), p. 16. A youth club had been formed in 1970 and now had a membership of several hundred boys. The article stated: "The club regularly organizes thematic evenings and meetings with veterans of the Soviet Army and Navy, commanding officers of advanced units. Normally the studies at the club are accompanied by shows of feature films and documentaries. The evening devoted to the theme 'Being an Officer is an Honor' was a success"

³⁹Unfortunately there remains another aspect of propaganda and agitation in the Soviet military which has not been discussed, but it does not rightly belong within the confines of this short study. That is the methods and techniques of propaganda and agitation among enemy troops. Of the hundreds of articles read and glanced at in the preparation of this paper, only one had any mention of this type of activity. A. Korkeshkin, "Proved in Battle," SMR, 1(January, 1972), p. 62. There the author mentions the use of radio and leaflets as a means of demoralizing the enemy. It is possible that this type of activity is not prepared for in peacetime, or, if it is, it is not publicized. In any case, all of the experience is of World War II vintage. Yet, that is a study unto itself.

⁴⁰If there were ever any question of the role of political education and emphasis in the Soviet military, one need only to point to the following institutions as examples: the Higher Military Political Tank and Artillery School and the Higher Military Political School of Combined Arms. Cited in V. Staritsyn, "A Political Worker's Talent," SMR, 5(May, 1973), p. 25.

⁴¹D. Mokeev, "The Commander's Vivifying Word," SMR, 3(March, 1973), p. 39.

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